A Fateful Decision

Route of the Narváez Expedition in 1527-28 (Expedition Cabeza de Vaca Karte, Wikimedia Commons)

As I’ve have already noted above (In the Narváez Story, What If…?), when the

expedition’s five boats and 251 survivors were ready to depart the Bay of Horses campsite on October 2, 1528 (modern Gregorian date), Narváez and his officers had a major decision to make. This phase of the expedition was fruitless, and they would need to regroup and resupply before trying again somewhere else in La Florida. The problem was, they weren’t sure of their location along that coast or where they could best hope to reconnect with their ships. The first outline map of the Gulf of Mexico drawn by Captain Alonso Álvarez de Pineda in 1519 portrayed the northern Gulf Coast at about half its actual length of some 1,300 miles by boat from St. Marks, Florida to Panuco, Mexico. Furthermore, the expedition had over-estimated their westward progress by land, suggesting that, at the Bay of Horses, they might already be approaching the halfway point toward Mexico. It was also reassuring that the coastline tended westward there. (The map above illustrates these relative distances.)

The question now was, should they continue going west or return southeastward to the landing site near Tampa Bay (about 200 miles by water), where they would most likely find their ships waiting or looking for them? If the ships were not there, they could always hope to continue south for another 400 miles or so to Cuba. The latter route would be the safer choice since the coastal features and distances were somewhat known. After all, they were inexperienced sailors embarking on a dangerous sea voyage in overloaded, hand-made boats.But according to Cabeza de Vaca’s account, there doesn’t seem to have been any serious debate about these options at the Bay of Horses. In the prior situation at the landing site near Tampa Bay, CdV had argued with Narváez about the wisdom of leaving the ships behind with no definite plan to reconnect with them at another port. But in this more desperate situation, he seems oddly silent about the decision to continue westward toward Mexico, even with uncertainties about the distance, the coastline, and the prospect of colder, stormier weather just ahead. Quite possibly they all believed—wanted to believe—that they were nearly halfway to Panuco in Mexico, and it would seem shameful to admit failure by retreating to the landing site or to Cuba. Given his earlier capture by Cortés at the battle of Cempoala in 1520, Narváez’s reputation was already tainted by that defeat. But in going on to Mexico he could at least claim the honor of having traversed most of La Florida and competed a major expedition objective. Perhaps that argument convinced his men as well.

It was a fateful decision that would condemn all but four of them to death.