Narváez vs. De Soto

The conquistador Hernando de Soto (Library of Congress)

In terms of accomplishing its avowed mission, the Narváez expedition was largely a failure. In contrast, the Hernando de Soto expedition to La Florida 11 years later was a much more successful exploration of that vast territory, even though it also failed to enrich the survivors. What accounts for the difference in outcomes? Was it leadership? Planning? Resources? Among other factors, those three best explain the difference. Both expeditions were launched near Tampa Bay and made the same inland trek to Apalache, where they controlled the hostile population more effectively. After a rendevous with their supply ships, De Soto’s party continued exploring for another 3,000 miles or so across the southeastern U.S., before some 300 survivors—about half of the expedition—built boats near the mouth of the Mississippi River and sailed westward along the coast to Mexico.

Both Narváez and De Soto were physically imposing men but not equally competent leaders. Narváez had led Spanish soldiers in the conquest of Cuba, where the native Taíno were generally a peaceful, agrarian people.  They resisted the Spanish, but were no real match for them militarily. The real test of Narváez’s leadership came in 1520, when he was sent by the governor of Cuba to arrest Hernán Cortés and replace him as the legitimate conquerer of Mexico. But the wily Cortés, through a combination of guile, bribery, and audacity, and with a fourth as many men, turned the tables on Narváez and took control of his army, making Narváez his prisoner for two years or so.

In comparison, Hernando de Soto had gained more hard-core military experience in the New World. He came to Central America as a teenager and soon made his reputation as a fighter and leader, taking part in the conquest of Veragua (now Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama). He later joined forces with the Pizarro brothers in the conquest of the Inca Empire in Peru. That lucrative conquest and his later marriage into the powerful Bobadilla and Peñalosa families made him even wealthier. In 1537, the king appointed him adelantado (conqueror) of La Florida—given that Narváez had vanished—and governor of Cuba. Only months later, De Soto learned that four men had survived the Narváez expedition. Its treasurer Cabeza de Vaca described their grueling experience in the wilderness but also talked up the potential for rich discoveries in that vast and varied landscape.

The story inspired De Soto to mount his own expedition, which he launched by way of Cuba to its landing near Tampa Bay in May 1539. His force consisted of about 700 men, many of them loyal Peru veterans, kinsmen, and fellow Extremadurans from Spain. He landed with nine ships and an army better equipped, provisioned, and staffed with skilled personnel, compared with that of Narváez. De Soto was more prudent in establishing a base there for resupplying the expedition by sea. Also, he had the good luck to aquire an interpreter and guide, a Spaniard capured by Indians from the Narváez troops. Finally, it’s clear that De Soto was more adroit than Narváez in leading his army effectively and managing their interactions with native peoples thoughout the long march though unfamiliar cultures and terrains. The expedition’s success and survival was a testament to his strong leadership, even after his death toward the end.